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The UK Government and the European Union are renegotiating the Withdrawal
Agreement. The former seeks the removal of the ‘Irish Backstop’ on the basis of
its ‘undemocratic character’ which infringes upon the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. As a contingency plan, the Prime Minister has asked the European
Council President in a letter for reciprocal ‘binding legal guarantees’ not to put in
place infrastructure, checks, or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and
Ireland. The significance of this has been amplified by the European Parliament’s
resolution that it will not consent to any Withdrawal Agreement without an Irish
Backstop, in direct contravention to the UK’s position.
This post will argue that the EU legal order places constraints on this option. Ireland
would be in breach of EU law if it followed this course, and the EU institutions
have no discretion to suspend these legal obligations. The only legally legitimate
option would be revision of the EU treaties, but this seems impracticable before
the UK’s exit day. Therefore the only practicable method would be the conclusion
of a simplified agreement in international law pre-committing the EU-27 to such
a revision in the event that solutions to the border problem are not realised in the
future relationship negotiations. Substantively, this could jeopardise the integrity
of the customs union and the single market. Procedurally, this would also create a
legitimacy deficit for the EU constitutional order.
Breaching EU law and violating the sovereignty of
the Member States
If the EU and Ireland were to acquiesce to the United Kingdom’s request, the
Member State would breach its treaty obligations under Title II TFEU on the free
movement of goods to adopt and maintain a common customs tariff in relation to
third countries. The European Commission, despite its political solidarity with Ireland,
would thus be obliged to bring infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice
of the European Union. 
Furthermore, unlike the United Kingdom which may rely upon residual prerogative
powers for the conduct of foreign policy, the EU institutions do not have the
executive discretion to suspend the operation of the legal order. Conferral of
powers means the EU can only act in the areas in which the Member States have
transferred competence. In the general conduct of international agreements,
this is regulated by Title V TEU and Part V TFEU on the Union’s external action.
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With specific regard to Brexit, these powers and obligations are strictly regulated
by Article 50 TEU, the references to legal bases on conclusion of international
agreements therein, and the mandate adopted by the European Council for
negotiations.
The text of the treaties is crucial.  The Treaties enshrine in legally binding form the
choices made by the contracting parties to pool their sovereignty on the international
plane. By asking the EU institutions to suspend the operation of EU law relating to
the border, the UK government is asking the EU to violate the sovereignty of the
remaining Member States in order to vindicate the sovereignty claims of a departing
state. The only constitutionally legitimate means to realise this would be for these
Member States to consent to such amendment through revision of the Treaties.
Revision of the treaties to create an exemption from
the customs union
The simplified revision procedure under Article 48 TEU would have to be used to
create the power to disapply EU law in relation to the Irish border.  This could take
the form of a new exemption to the customs union obligation drawing inspiration
from the exemptions in relation to the single market provided for in Article 36 TFEU.
Following this text, such exemptions could be ‘justified on ground of…public security;
[and] the protection of health and life of humans”. Ireland could then justify relying on
this new exemption to serve the purposes of upholding the Good Friday Agreement
and an open border to prevent the return of the hostilities of the Troubles. 
There are severe procedural constraints beyond generating the necessary political
will amongst the 27 Member States and the EU institutions. The amendment would
need to be ratified by all of the national and regional parliaments within the EU. It
seems unfeasible that the full necessary scrutiny and decision-making could be
carried out before the 31 October, or even the 31 January if a further Article 50
extension is granted.
International law facilitation and legitimacy deficits
A device from the earliest chapters of the Brexit saga could be revived as a practical
means to realise the request for ‘legally binding guarantees’ not to enforce border
checks as a contingency plan if a replacement for the backstop is not found. The
Decision on a ‘New Settlement for the UK’ in February 2016 would have come into
force if the UK had voted to remain. This took the form of a simplified international
treaty, rather than EU law, concluded between the 27 heads of state or government
using the European Council as a forum. Part of the Decision was a pre-commitment
for the next treaty revision that the principle of ‘ever closer union’ would no longer
apply to the UK. The Commission also issued Declarations that it would initiate
revision of secondary legislation to enable an ‘emergency brake’ on social security
co-ordination in the event of large inflows of EU citizens into a Member State. 
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The Member States and the UK could draw upon their reserved sovereignty in
order to conclude a similar international agreement with the UK to provide pre-
commitments to amend the treaty in the event of a failure to find a solution to the
border problem after Brexit. This mechanism has also been proposed by Joseph
Weiler, Daniel Sarmiento, and Jonathan Faull as a means to realise substantive
alternatives to the backstop. For the amendment proposed above, there would
be a resemblance to the 2016 Decision insofar as the exception could also be
understood as an ‘emergency brake’ for Member States that would find themselves
in a precarious situation such as Ireland.
However, the use of international law to bypass EU law constraints also poses
legitimacy problems. Transparency is lacking within the European Council forum
because the intergovernmental deliberations between heads of state or government
remain private. This impacts upon the capacity for scrutiny by national parliaments of
their executives’ decisions. Bypassing the EU constitutional channels of the ordinary
revision procedure and ordinary legislative procedure also displaces the functions of
the EU institutions.
In addition to these throughput legitimacy problems, the use of international law also
poses problems for input legitimacy. In concluding such a Decision, the national
governments would derive their legitimacy solely from the citizens of these Member
States. This excludes the voice of individuals in their role as EU citizens as directly
represented by the European Parliament. When the EU institutions may come
to exercise their initiation and consultative roles in treaty revision, the Member
States will have already bound the Convention through the prior international law
agreement. The results of the match will have been pre-determined before the
players enter the pitch.
Finally, these procedural deficiencies are exacerbated by the risks that such a
mechanism would pose for the integrity of the internal market. This affects the
output legitimacy of the substance of the single market as the ‘core’ of the EU legal
order. The four freedoms facilitate individuals to exercise their life-plans across
borders. An emergency suspension mechanisms for the customs union could set a
dangerous precedent, and undermine the idea that the four freedoms are indivisible
and immutable. However, the presence of exemptions for the free movement of
goods and people in the internal markets suggests that such action is not impossible.
Conclusion
There are legal, practical, and political problems with the UK Prime Minister’s
request for legally binding guarantees that the EU will not enforce EU law in relation
to the Irish border as a fall-back for renegotiations. The only legitimate means to
achieve this would be treaty revision to create a new power of exemption from the
customs union. Substantively this could present risks to the uniformity of the single
market. Procedurally the only practical means to achieve this would have serious
legitimacy defects. In the event that the United Kingdom rejects the backstop, the
question for the EU’s constitutional legislators would be whether the sacrifices to the
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internal market and the customs union are justified by the existential threats to the
EU and Ireland posed by a no deal Brexit. 
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